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Abstract
The rapid progress in generative models and autoencoders has given rise to effective
video tampering techniques, used for generating deepfakes. Mitigation research is
mostly focused on post-factum deepfake detection and not prevention. We com-
plement these efforts by proposing a prevention technique against face-swapping
autoencoders. Our technique consists of a novel training-resistant adversarial attack
that can be applied to a video to disrupt face-swapping manipulations. Our attack
introduces spatial-temporal distortions to the output of the face-swapping autoen-
coders, and it holds whether or not our adversarial images have been included
in the training set of said autoencoders. To implement the attack, we construct
a bilevel optimization problem, where we train a generator and a face-swapping
model instance against each other. Specifically, we pair each input image with
a target distortion, and feed them into a generator that produces an adversarial
image. This image will exhibit the distortion when a face-swapping autoencoder
is applied to it. We solve the optimization problem by training the generator and
the face-swapping model simultaneously using an iterative process of alternating
optimization. Finally, we validate our attack using a popular implementation of
FaceSwap, and show that our attack transfers across different models and target
faces. More broadly, these results demonstrate the existence of training-resistant
adversarial attacks, potentially applicable to a wide range of domains.
1 Introduction
Recent improvements in deep learning have contributed to the rise of questionable applications that
perform synthetic image rendering, known as deepfakes. They are used maliciously in various ways,
from "face swapping" - replacing a persons face in a video with another to misrepresent the target [24]
to "face reenactment" [22] - which alters the expressions of a target person in a video by transferring
the expressions of a source person to the target.
Efforts to combat such deepfake systems have mostly focused on detection [5, 10, 15, 18, 27, 28, 32],
rather than prevention. While identifying content as fraudulent is extremely important, when it comes
to content that besmirches a person’s reputation - it’s sole existence might mean the damage is already
done, and victims will forever remain affected.
Recently, a new approach to prevent deepfakes has surfaced - implementing adversarial attacks on
the malicious deepfake models. An adversarial attack on a given model involves applying minute
changes to a given input that are imperceptible by a human, but should the model be applied to the
modified input, its output would be erroneous. Two examples of such successful attacks against
deepfake systems have been shown in [19, 30].
Such adversarial attacks are effective in defeating deepfakes when the model is unlikely to be trained
on data that includes the adversarial samples. Unfortunately, not all scenarios have this constraint.
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For example, in a fake news scenario such as [23], a deceiver might train a face-swapping model
from scratch on videos of a political figure, in order to swap their face with another. Protecting the
political figure’s videos by injecting adversarial samples would cause these samples to be included in
the deepfake model’s training set, which could thwart the attack.
In this work, we propose a new family of attacks: training-resistant adversarial attacks. These
attacks are similarly applied against a given model to produce adversarial samples, but they are a
stronger form of adversarial attacks since they survive training. When the attacked model is applied
to these samples, it will yield an erroneous output, whether or not these adversarial samples were
included in its training data.
We demonstrate such a training-resistant attack against the face-swapping application of deepfake. We
chose to focus on this application both because of the increasingly widespread usage of face-swapping
in deepfakes, and because face-swapping is a good representative case of a deepfake model, and a
successful attack on it could likely be generalized to more applications.
Our attack aims to inject minute perturbations to source video frames, so that when a face-swapping
model is applied to them, the output includes visible spatial-temporal distortions that warp it, making
the swap evident to a human eye. To achieve this goal and the property of training resistance, we
formulate this objective as a general bilevel optimization problem, where we train a face-swapping
model instance and an adversarial sample generator against each other; we choose this path over a
more specific Minimax problem because we want to avoid modifying the FaceSwap autoencoder’s
loss function, while keeping the flexibility to modify the adversarial network’s loss function, and
direct it toward generating samples that result in effective disruptions.
2 Related Work
Adversarial attacks had been extensively studied in the context of classification problems [1, 2, 4,
8, 12, 14, 16, 20, 25], but less research was published on their effect on generative models and
autoencoders [7, 11, 21]. Tabacof et al. [7, 21] and Kos et al. [11] explore adversarial attacks against
Variational Autoencoders (VAE), where Autoencoders and VAE-GAN models are used for image
compression. Wang et al. [26] adapt adversarial attacks to image-to-image translation tasks under
both paired and unpaired settings. Additionally for the paired setting they adapt a poisoning attack on
the target domain. Yeh et al. [30] and Ruiz et al. [19] are two concurrent works to ours, which explore
adversarial attacks to disrupt deepfake models. Yeh et al. propose a distorting attack in which the
image translation model output becomes corrupt and a nullifying attack in which the model becomes
the identity mapping. Ruiz et al. [19] explore distorting attacks and extend them to conditional
image translation networks. Additionally they adapt adversarial training [14] for conditional image
translation GANs. Willetts et al. [29] explore defenses against adversarial attacks for VAE.
All of these attacks assume that the target models were trained using pristine data, a reasonable
assumption for many applications. Unfortunately, for many other deepfake tasks this assumption
doesn’t hold. For example, in a face-swapping scenario, a deceiver aims to swap the faces of A and
B for some video vA, which requires training a specific A→ B model, and therefore collecting the
corresponding training data. Since, in this scenario, vA is available to the deceiver, the training data
is likely to include images from vA - which is the video we aim to protect, and therefore, will contain
our adversarial images. Such cases prove a challenge to the attacks proposed by earlier works.
Consequently, an effective attack on this scenario should assume adversarial images might be included
in the training data so the attack must be training-resistant, as defined in section 1. On the other
hand, unlike in a poisoning attack (where one aims to poison the training data with bad inputs), our
training-resistant attack should also assume that they might not be there, and succeed either way. This
independence makes our attack much more robust.
In this work, we demonstrate an effective training resistant adversarial attack on face-swapping
models. To the best of our knowledge, we are first to introduce a training-resistant adversarial attack
in any domain.
2
3 Method
3.1 DeepFakes generation
While the term deepfake has become synonymous with its result of replacing a face in a video, it
also refers to a specific face swapping method. The most notable implementation of this method is
[24], as has been analyzed by [18] and many others. In this section, we will briefly describe this
implementation of deepfake.
This system receives as input an image sequence featuring source face A (a video, in this context,
is viewed as an image sequence), and a sequence featuring target face B. First, an extraction phase
extracts the faces from the images, aligns them, and creates masks that indicate where each face
is located in each image. Next, two autoencoders with a shared encoder are trained to reconstruct
images of the source and target faces. These autoencoders are trained on an augmentation of the input
images, created via rotations, translations, magnifications and minute random color changes. Then,
they are optimized using a reconstruction loss, which consists of a mask loss and a face loss which is
weighted by the input mask. The reconstruction loss is defined as follows:
Lk(x,m) = ‖
(
ffacek (x)− x
)m‖1 + ‖fmaskk (x)−m‖1
Where ffacek , f
mask
k are the autoencoder face and mask outputs, x is the input image, m is the input
mask and  denotes a point-wise multiplication. We will refer to this loss as the FaceSwap loss.
This yields an encoder & decoder pair for both face A and face B, where the decoders output both an
image and face mask.
Finally, a swapped face is produced by applying the trained encoder and decoder of face B to the
target images of face A. The output face is blended into the target image using the face mask.
DeepFake architectures FaceSwap [24] offers several autoencoder architectures and configura-
tions, but training a FaceSwap model is an expensive task that requires several days on high end
GPUs. Hence, a full evaluation of all the models is beyond the scope of this paper. Accordingly, we
chose 3 architectures for our research:
• realface: This architecture uses skip connections for both its encoder and its decoders.
It also uses an unbalanced framework where the autoencoder for the target face B has
additional layers.
• dfl-h128: DeepFaceLab [9] is the one of the most popular deepfake implementations. This
model includes a 128 × 128 pixels input model without skip connections, and closely
reassembles the original model implanted in [24].
• dfl-sae: Another DeepFaceLab [9] architecture, this one uses skip connections only for the
decoders.
These models provide us with diverse architecture types and represent the 2 most popular implemen-
tations of deepfake - [24, 9].
3.2 Optimization problem formulation
Our system’s objective is to add a tamper-evident feature to videos, disrupting attempts to manipulate
them using deepfake. Thus, for a given video v including the face A, our system will output a
modified video v′, where the differences between v and v′ are imperceptible to a human observer.
However, when the deepfake system is executed on v′ with some target face B, the resulting fB(v′)
will include, instead of a seamless replacement ofA withB, major human-visible artifacts identifying
the deepfake tampering performed - thus defeating the attempted face swapping.
To achieve this goal, we use a class of disruptions to modify each frame in video v which are
imperceptible in v′, but cause a change in the location, scaling and angle of face B in fB(v′).
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To formulate this, we define an adversarial generator G(x,N) which receives as input a face image x
and a target affine transformation N . G(x,N) outputs a modified face image satisfying:
G(x,N) = argmin
y
Ladv(y, x,N)
s.t. ‖y − x‖∞ ≤ ε
Where ε is used to control the magnitude of the adversarial perturbation, which is common in
adversarial settings [8], and Ladv is the adversarial loss function defined by:
Ladv(y, x,N) = ‖(ffaceA (y)−N(x)‖1 + α1 · ‖y − x‖1
Where α1 is used to further minimize the magnitude of the perturbation, and N is an affine transfor-
mation operating on x by assigning the pixel z(i,j) the value of:
x(N11·i+N12·j+N13, N21·i+N22·j+N23)
Furthermore, since the autoencoder-predicted face’s location and shape is strongly coupled with that
of the predicted mask, it is sufficient to define Ladv as:
Ladv(y, x,m,N) = ‖fmaskA (y)−N(mx)‖1 + α1 · ‖y − x‖1
Where mx is the face’s mask.
For the adversarial loss, we use the autoencoder fA of face A. We do this to keep the adversarial
loss an internal process, i.e. defined by face A as much as possible, since an internal process will
likely increase the odds for transferability of our adversarial attack to target faces other than B. An
alternative we considered was using the predicted mask of fB for the loss function - however, we
cannot assume that fmaskB matches the input mask of face A, and therefore manipulating f
mask
B to
match Nx(mx) seems ineffective.
Now, let DA,DB be the datasets used for training the FaceSwap autoencoders for faces A and B. Let
PA ⊆ DA be the subset of data we can control and would like to protect. For each (x,mx) ∈ PA we
pick a distortion transformation Nx. We aim to find an adversarial generator such that:
G? =argmin
G
∑
(x,mx)∈PA
Ladv(G(x,Nx), x, fmaska (x), Nx)
s.t. (fA, fB) ∈
{
argmin
fA,fB
LB(DB) + LA(DA \ PA) +
∑
(x,mx)∈PA
LA(G(x,Nx),mx)
}
Remarks An important factor in our problem formulation is the exclusion of the `∞ constraint.
This is due to our design of G, in which we enforce the `∞ constraint via the network architecture
itself.
We chose to use the predicated mask fmaska (x) for labels in Ladv instead of using the input mask
mx. This choice was made after running our initial experiments, where our expected level of
image distortion was not achieved. These results showed that using mx as label in Ladv causes an
unexpected issue with the autoencoder’s performance - instead of transforming image x according
to Nx, the autoencoder adjusted its predicted mask, making it marginally wider, and with sharper
boundaries - thus decreasing the adversarial loss, without achieving the required distortion. This led
us to replace mx with fmaska (x). This modification forces G to keep trying to increase the image’s
distortion.
3.3 Training procedure
Next, we proceed to the design of the training algorithm. We begin by constructing, for each x, an
affine transformation Nx as Nx =Mx+ I , where I =
(
1 0 0
0 1 0
)
, and Mx is a randomly sampled 2× 3
matrix, with its `∞ norm normalized to be γ, thus ensuring our transformations all have the same
magnitude. Specifically, Mx is generated by sampling 6 numbers from a normal distribution with
zero mean, and a standard deviation β.
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Algorithm 1: Alternating training algorithm
Input: Training data DA,DB, target training data PA, number of epochs N , number of iterations
used for training the generator on each batch BatchIters, Optimizers OptG, OptfA , OptfB
used for training the generator and autoencoders, Affine transformations learning rate θ,
Affine transformations `∞ norm γ
Output: Learned Adversarial Generator G and Affine transformation for each x ∈ PA
1 for epoch = 1 to N do
2 for i = 1 to number of batches in PA do
3 bx, bm, bN ← PA-batch: images, mask and transformations
4 bpredictedm ← fmaskA (bx)
5 for k = 1 to BatchIters do
6 bN ← SGD(bN , bx, bpredictedm , θ) // Optimize N
7 bN ← Project(bN , γ, I) // Project Nx to the γ sphere around I
8 end
9 for mx in bpredictedm do
10 b′m,x ← Nx(mx) // Prepare the distorted mask labels for the adversarial loss
11 end
12 for k = 1 to BatchIters do
13 G← optG(bx, bN , b′m) // Train G on batch
14 end
15 badvx ← G(bx, bN )
16 baugx , b
aug
m ← Augment(badvx , bm)
17 fA ← optfA(baugx , baugm )
18
19 caugx , c
aug
m ← Augmented DB-batch images and masks
20 fB ← optfB (caugx , caugm )
21 end
22 for i = 1 to number of batches in (DA \ PA) do
23 baugx , b
aug
m ← Augmented DA-batch images and masks
24 fA ← optfA(baugx , baugm )
25
26 caugx , c
aug
m ← Augmented DB-batch images and masks
27 fB ← optfB (caugx , caugm )
28 end
29 end
30 return G and Nx for each x ∈ PA
In order to optimize Nx, we introduce another loss function. This function should target an increase
in our spatial-temporal video distortions - as such it should aim to maximize the variance of Nx
across our target dataset PA. In addition, for each image x we’d like to find the affine transformation
most likely to succeed in manipulating the face’s location, angle and shape, while assuming that Nx
belongs to the `∞ sphere of radius γ around I . Consequently, we define our new loss function to be:
Lnoise(bN ,B) = −α2 · σ(bN )− 1|B|
∑
(x,mx)∈B
‖fmaskA (G(x,Nx))−Nx(fmaska (x))‖1
Where B is a batch of face images and masks, bN is a batch of affine transformations Nx, and σ is
the standard deviation of bN .
For the next part of the training algorithm, we note that our bilevel optimization problem is closely re-
lated to the one used in poisoning attacks such as [17]. Therefore, we similarly solve the optimization
problem by running an iterative process of alternating optimization of both G (via the adversarial
loss Ladv) and fA, fB (via the FaceSwap losses LA,LB).
Finally, in order to stabilize the training process and to achieve stronger distortions of the output,
we allow our generator extra training cycles for each batch we train on. The resulting algorithm is
summarized in Algorithm 1.
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Network architecture For our adversarial generator, we choose to rely on the work in [2, 6] and
use an autoencoder architecture. Specifically, we adapted the dfl-h128 autoencoder used in FaceSwap
[24], which we’ve chosen since it is the model we train against in Algorithm 1. To address the `∞
constraint, we use tanh non-linearity in our last convolutional layer and multiply the result by ε. A
detailed description of the generator network’s architecture is shown in figure 1.
Figure 1: The architecture of our generator.
4 Experiments
We evaluate our attack against the face-swapping models described in section 3.1, with some slight
adjustments so the models would have the same input size and they could be trained with the same
batch size while fitting in our GPU’s memory. First, we match the input size of the realface model
to 128× 128. Next, we slightly decrease the sizes of realface (by setting dense_nodes to 1408) and
dfl-h128 (by setting low_memory=True). This decrease in size should not affect the efficacy of our
technique on the original models.
Datasets We collected several videos from YouTube for 3 people A,B,C. For each person, we
first extracted their face images from the videos using S3FD [31] and aligned them using FAN [3].
Then, we removed blurry images and the face images of other people appearing in the videos. This
resulted in a set of about 5000 face images for each person. For our dataset PA, we arbitrarily choose
person A and focus on the subset of 444 face A images extracted from one of their videos, vA.
4.1 Generation of adversarial images
We train the adversarial generator against a low-memory version of the dfl-h128 model using
Algorithm 1, with the following hyperparameters: ε = 2255 , α1 =
3
255 , α2 = 0.012, β = 0.15, γ =
0.225, BatchIters = 8. To optimize the affine transformations, we use a learning rate of θ = 0.001.
All of the networks were trained using the Adam optimizer with the following hyperparameters:
β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.9999, a learning rate of 5× 10−5 and a batch size of 64. The generator has been
trained for 1024 epochs using DA,PA and DB. As explained in Algorithm 1 above, this results in
the trained adversarial generator, as well as output affine transformations.
Next, we use these generator and transformations to calculate the adversarial images of the face
images in PA, and we patch them back onto their original video vA resulting in the adversarial video
v′A. As before, we extract and align face images using S
3FD and FAN from v′A and merge these
images with rest of face As images (without the pristine face images from vA). We call this new
dataset D′A.
4.2 Evaluation
We first evaluate our attack against face swapping models trained using the dataset D′A, which
includes our adversarial images. We trained the dfl-h128 model for the task of face swapping A→ B.
Additionally, in order to evaluate the transferability of our attack across architectures, we trained
both the dfl-sae and realface models for A → B. We trained another dfl-h128 model for A → C
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to also evaluate the transferability across different target faces. All models were trained for 200000
iterations using the Adam optimizer with the following hyperparameters: β1 = 0.5, β2 = 0.999, a
learning rate of 5× 10−5 and a batch size of 64. The training was executed using the FaceSwap code
[24] using its default hyperparameters, and the same number of training iterations as were used to
generate the FaceForensics dataset [18], which is used for the detection of face swapped videos.
Figure 2: Samples from dfl-h128 model trained for 500000 iterations on D′A. First row from left to
right: Pristine consecutive face images from our video, visualization of their difference, their face
swapping output and a visualization of its difference. Second row from left to right: adversarial
perturbations of the same consecutive images, visualization of their difference, their face swapping
output and a visualization of its difference.
Figure 2 shows that injecting the adversarial perturbations to the pristine video creates a difference
between consecutive frames that’s similar to white noise added to the natural difference between the
matching pristine frames - this is why the perturbations are not observable in the adversarial source
video. However, the difference between consecutive frames of this video after a deepfake model is
applied to it resembles a face - this is because the attack caused the face’s location to shift. This shift
is noticeable in the disrupted video, as can be seen in the video in the supplementary material1.
Spatial-temporal score A more quantitative way to measure the video distortion, is to calculate
the average `2 distance between consecutive video frames of the face swapped video. However, since
regular consecutive video frames exhibit a natural spatial-temporal difference, we normalize the score
to account for this differences. Consequently, our spatial-temporal score will be defined as the ratio
of the distortion scores of the modified and original videos. Formally, let fk be our face swapping
autoencoder, let xi be the face images from vA, and x′i be the face images from v
′
A. We define yi, y
′
i
to be the face swapped images of xi, x′i by fk (calculated using the predicted face and mask of fk as
described in section 3), and finally we define the spatial-temporal score of fk as:
s(fk) =
∑n−1
i=1 ‖y′i+1 − y′i‖2∑n−1
i=1 ‖yi+1 − yi‖2
Having defined the spatial-temporal score metric, we can analyze the score of our attack, as applied
to the various models - see Table1. These results show that even though the face swapping models’
training data included our adversarial images, our attack successfully created major artifacts in the
resulting video, increasing the average `2 distance between consecutive images by at least 4.1%.
Next, we validate that our attack is successful even when our adversarial images are excluded from
the training set DA, thus confirming that our attack is training-resistant, rather than a poisoning attack
which requires injecting samples into the training process. We train dfl-h128, dfl-sae and realface
on DA \ PA and DB for (A→ B), and another dfl-h128 model for A→ C. Training is performed
in the same way described before, and the spatial-temporal score is calculated for each model. As
expected - the spatial-temporal scores appearing in Table 2 are much higher than in Table 1, which is
also reflected in the greater magnitude of the distortions seen in the second demo video2.
1See the first demo video in https://youtu.be/xOlXKQp4pks
2See the second demo video in https://youtu.be/kk7DS3VCvPk
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Table 1: Spatial-temporal scores for models trained for 200000 iterations on a dataset which includes
our adversarial images.
Architecture Swapping direction Spatial-temporal score
dfl-h128 A→ B 1.048
dfl-h128 A→ C 1.041
dfl-sae A→ B 1.058
realface A→ B 1.048
Table 2: Spatial-temporal scores for models trained for 200000 iterations on a pristine dataset.
Architecture Swapping direction Spatial-temporal score
dfl-h128 A→ B 1.135
dfl-h128 A→ C 1.133
dfl-sae A→ B 1.155
realface A→ B 1.092
Finally, we investigate the effect of extra training on D′A. We train our dfl-h128 model on the task
A→ B for another 300000 iterations, and calculate the spatial-temporal score every 25000 iterations.
As shown in Figure 3, the spatial-temporal score begins to stabilize after 300000 iterations, and even
after 500000 iterations it remains larger than 1.0 with a value of 1.029. These distortions are still
highly noticeable, as can be be observed in Figure 2. This confirms that even a resourceful deceiver
will fail in manipulating v′A due to our attack.
Figure 3: Spatial-temporal scores for dfl-h128 model trained on the taskA→ B for 500000 iterations.
5 Conclusions
In this work we introduced the notion of a training-resistant adversarial attack. Such an attack
generates adversarial samples against a given model such that when the model is applied to these
samples, the model’s intended effect is disrupted - even if the same adversarial samples were part
of the model’s training data. This is a key difference between this family of attacks and poisoning
attacks, since poisoning attacks require that the adversarial samples be part of the training data.
Additionally, we applied such a training-resistant adversarial attack against face-swapping autoen-
coders. We then successfully validated our results against a commonly used FaceSwap implementation
[24], and showed that our attack transfers across different models and target faces. Therefore, we
believe that our technique can be applied to other deepfake autoencoders, which opens interesting
new avenues for disrupting deepfake models for future research.
These results demonstrate the existence and feasibility of training-resistant adversarial attacks,
potentially applicable to a wide range of domains.
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Broader Impact
Image manipulation based deepfakes is already being used for malicious applications, from the
synthesis of non-consensual pornography [13], to fraudulent attempts to misrepresent politicians and
influencing the democratic process itself, as happened in Belgium in 2020 [23]. A technique to protect
videos against image manipulation would be a boon in these circumstances, providing much-needed
protection. However, a malicious attacker could apply our technique to other, benevolent cases of
image-to-image transfer learning, with negative consequences. For example, Wang et al. in [26]
discuss disrupting the performance of self-driving cars using an adversarial attack on the datasets
used to train the vehicles; our training-resistant technique could make such attacks more feasible to
malicious attackers, interfering with the performance of self driving cars.
More broadly, the advent of training-resistant adversarial attacks presents a challenge to Deep Neural
Networks (DNNs) in general. Today, a common method for improving the robustness of critical DNN
models involves training them on adversarial examples, as in [14]. Future work might generalize
training-resistant adversarial attacks to succeed in subverting such a model, even if it has trained on
their adversarial examples. For example, a piece of malicious software could evade an anti-virus
model trained to classify code as malicious or benign, despite the model being trained on intercepted
samples of the malicious software itself.
On the other hand, as we show in our implementation, training-resistant adversarial attacks can be
used to foil a malicious application of a DNN by protecting its possible targets; in fact, our research
shows how a method with traditionally malicious applications towards DNNs (adversarial attacks)
can be implemented in a way that protects data against manipulation by an unethical applications
of a DNN. As such, we believe that while these novel attacks do carry some risk, their potential for
defeating malicious applications of DNNs make them an exciting and relevant field of study in the
modern machine learning landscape.
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